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Abstract 
Home and commercial alarms are an integral physical security measure that have become so commonplace that 
little thought is given to the security that they may or may not provide. Whilst the focus has shifted from physical 
security in the past to cyber security in the present, physical security for protecting assets may be just as 
important for many business organisations. This research looks at 700 genuine alarm PIN codes chosen by 
users to arm and disarm alarm systems in a commercial environment. A comparison is made with a study of 
millions of PIN numbers unrelated to alarms to compare the results in order to allow a prediction of the alarm 
codes utilised in these systems. Results show that PIN number for alarm codes are often chosen differently than 
other PIN numbers and an analysis of the alarm codes gives an indication of how users choose codes. The codes 
are ranked in various groupings and results show that a non-sequential brute force attack against an alarm 
system using the results of this study greatly reduce the number of codes tried by an attacker before a disarming 
code is discovered. The results can be used to assist users in choosing codes that are less predictable than the 
codes that are often chosen today. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Alarm systems are commonplace in business and domestic settings. Basic alarms to protect property have been 
recorded as early as 386 BC where animals were used to guard valuables and objects and were placed in 
positions so when disturbed would alert the occupants. Bellis (n.d) states that the history of locks date back 
approximately 4000 years where a lock was found by archaeologists in the Khorsabad near Nivenah. The use of 
alarm systems is twofold: to detect and alert the owners of property that a breach has occurred but equally to act 
as a deterrent to would be offenders. Advertising the presence of an alarm system has shown to be something of 
a deterrent to potential burglars, meaning often that the potential offenders will move on to a premises that does 
not have an alarm. The New Zealand Police report that approximately 143 burglaries are committed each day 
against business and domestic premises, but resolved cases only account for 13% of these break-ins. The 
effectiveness of an alarm system therefore derives from advertising its presence and ensuring its effectiveness if 
an offender is detected.   
The most common method of authenticating to an alarm system is a code or PIN number.  Most alarm systems 
require a PIN number of at least 4 numbers, with many allowing up to 10 numbers or more. Whilst some alarms 
have a lockout feature where multiple wrong codes will disable the keypad for a time or set off the alarm, many 
alarm systems either don’t have this feature or do not have the feature enabled. Whilst longer codes are more 
secure from a brute force attack, most PIN numbers are found to be 4 digits as this is easier to remember than 
longer numbers and humans are incapable of choosing random numbers which leads to a level of predictability 
of those PIN numbers (Gutmann,A. Volkamer,M. Renaud,K. 2016).  This research looks at the process of 
conducting an attack utilising a brute force method to find a PIN code for the alarm, but rather than utilising the 
usual sequential attack beginning at 0000 and incrementing the code by one until successful, known codes are 
analysed so that the attack can work through the more likely codes first and try the less likely codes last. 
 There are three different types of codes involved in an alarm system. These are the Master Code, Installer Code 
and the Standard User Code. According to the Alarm Forum (n.d), the Master Code is a code which is most 
commonly used and it acts as both a User code to arm and disarm the alarm and to enable resetting of user codes 
on the alarm system. This code allows full usage however without access right to the alarm system’s control 
panel, which can be performed with Installer Code. This type of code would allow full programming access to 
change user codes if required (Monitoring Plus, 2006). This privilege is given to the Master code so the user 
does not need to call the security company every time modification of user codes is required. The standard 
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NZS2201:2007, the section 5.6.2 explicitly prohibits the reissue of the master code unless there is an extremely 
unavoidable situation to do so. The user code is the most basic code with very limited access rights and which is 
used to arm and disarm the system. This code has less privilege compared to the Master Code and the only 
function of it is to arm and disarm the system.  
 
Figure 1: Standard Alarm System Keypad 
Keypads do not place a restriction on using the same number multiple times. Therefore, there are 10,000 
possible four digit PIN number combinations from 0000-9999. An intruder may be able to attempt multiple 
guesses of the PIN number before the alarm is activated. If a sensor is placed so that anyone gaining physical 
access to the keypad alerts the system by activating the sensor, the intruder may be given a very short time to 
enter a correct PIN number. This is often no more than 30 seconds before the alarm system responds with a siren 
and may also dial a predetermined phone number to alert the recipient of the alarm activation. If a keypad is 
placed where access can be gained without activating a sensor, as is often the case, the intruder may be able to 
try many thousands of PIN numbers without activating the system. The possibility of an intruder trying 
seemingly random numbers and finding a correct code in a short space of time is very unlikely. However, if 
numbers are not chosen randomly but have some meaning to the user or are chosen for reasons that may be 
common such as easy to remember combinations such as 1234, then the chances of success are greatly 
increased.   
In his research into 3.4 million PIN number in a database constructed from a variety of PIN numbers released 
onto the Internet, Berry (2012) discovered certain numbers are chosen more frequently than others and argued 
that people are not particularly strong at choosing a difficult to guess PIN number. The most common numbers 
that are a variety of different PIN numbers but likely not alarm codes, as Berry was unable to ascertain exactly 
where they had come from, are shown in table 1. By identifying the most popularly used PIN numbers and 
performing a brute force attack to the system using these more common PIN numbers first, an intruder may 
successfully gain entry to the premise in a much shorter time than simply systematically trying every number 
from 0000 to 9999.  
 
Table 1: Four digit PIN codes most commonly in use (Berry 2012) 
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
PIN 1234 1111 0000 1212 7777 1004 2000 4444 2222 6969 9999 3333 5555 6666 1122 1313 8888 4321 2001 1010 
Freq 10 6.0 1.9 1.2 0.75 0.66 0.61 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.45 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.28 
The following section describes the process of analysing PIN numbers to identify the most common types of 
numbers and therefore predict what numbers are more likely to be chosen than others. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The researchers were able to obtain 700 genuine and freely chosen 4 digit alarm codes used in businesses in 
New Zealand and these were used as the dataset for analysis. Experiments by the researcher utilising an alarm 
keypad and stop watch  found on average a person entering a 4 digit PIN number onto a keypad would take 
approximately 5 seconds per PIN number. If using a brute force attack against a 4 digit PIN number trying all 
possible 10,000 combinations, it would take an attacker approximately 50,000 seconds, which is 13.9 hours. If 
the PIN numbers are chosen genuinely at random, then on average the number will be located in half that time. 
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Rasmussen and Rudmin (2010) point out the problem of people’s difficulty with memorising number codes 
causes problems. Although it is a well-known that longer and more complicated PIN codes are more difficult to 
guess or crack, the lack of users’ ability to memorise more complex passcodes means a tendency to choose 
numbers that are easy for them to remember and thus easier to guess or predict. Rasmussen and Rudmin (2012) 
attempted to investigate people’s common strategies and difficulties when memorising a PIN number including 
making a pattern on the keypad rather than remembering a series of numbers.  
With this in mind, the focus becomes how best to predict a number or a method used by a user to choose as the 
code. Whilst some codes are more likely to occur than others, the purpose of this research was to identify what 
types of codes are more likely to be chosen, and therefore groups of ‘likely’ codes could be tried first. The brute 
force attack could therefore begin with the most likely group, move on to the next most likely group and so on 
until the final most unlikely group was the last to be tried. It was hoped that by analysing the 700 PIN codes, 
groups of codes could be established greatly speeding up the success of a brute force attack. The first task was to 
identify the PIN codes that were used multiple times. Initially the study by Berry was used to identify any 
correlation between his study’s findings and the database of alarm codes. A comparison of these codes with the 
alarm code database found that there was some relationship between the Berry findings and the alarm codes but 
some specific codes had almost no relationship. For example, Berry found that the number ‘1234’ was utilised 
over 10% of the time, whereas the alarm database found that it was used for 2 out of the 700 or 0.00314% of the 
time. However, the use of repeating numbers within the code did occur frequently in the database as Berry had 
found. Taking into consideration the study and findings of Berry (2012), his category of numbers was used 
along with two additional categories, those PIN numbers beginning with 19?? and 20?? which may indicate a 
year of significance to a user. Another category considered was a PIN number which is composed with a 
sequential number either ascending or descending order. This category was considered due to its relative 
simplicity for memorising PIN numbers in such characteristics and due to the fact that Berry (2012) has 
identified 1234 as the most popularly used PIN numbers. Due to this, certain PIN numbers may fall into two 
categories: such as PIN number 1999. This will fall into a category of a year, and also into a category of PIN 
number that is composed with two different digits only. The following categories were chosen. 
 Category 1: PIN number is composed of four different digits 
o In this category, the code contains numbers that are all unique. That is, no number is repeated in the code 
but the four numbers will form a certain pattern on the keypad. 
 Category 2: PIN number is composed of three different digits 
o In this category, 2 numbers are unique and one other number is repeated. On the keypad, this allows for a 
code that can fit on a line composed of 3 numbers wide by repeating a number. 
 Category 3: PIN number is composed of two different digits 
o In this category there are only 2 numbers and either both are repeated once or one of those numbers is 
repeated 3 times. 
 Category 4: PIN number is composed of one number only 
o In this category, a single number is used and repeated 4 times. 
 Category 5: PIN number with 19 or 20 
o  In this category, the user has apparently chosen a recent year of significance  
 Category 6: PIN number with sequential numbering: 
o In this category, the user has chosen a PIN number with 4 digits in numerical ordering. This can be 
ascending or descending starting from any digit.  
By utilising these 6 broad categories, the numbers that may fit into those categories can be identified and then 
their frequency in the database found. The first 3 categories focus on patterns that may be identified and 
therefore more easily remembered. It was noted that there may be some numbers chosen by users for some 
significance, but that coincidentally fit into a pattern such as a straight line. Additionally, some numbers will fit 
into more than one category. These are identified and guidelines used to ensure that all numbers appear once in 
the guideline and are not repeated. The next step in the process is to examine each category and construct more 
specific sub-categories based on the codes physical appearance on the keypad. The aim of category 1 and 2 is to 
identify all the possible patterns on a keypad that can be formed.  
 Category 1: PIN number is composed of four different digits 
1) Square (Four corners)   
2) Four digits in the middle of the keypad making a vertical line  
3) Diamond shape  
4) Rectangle shape  
5) L shape in any orientation 
6) Reverse L shape in any orientation 
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7) Y shape  
 
 
Table 2: Category 1 Number Groupings 
Pattern Number PIN Number Combination 
Square (Four Corners) 24 1397, 1379, 1793, 1739, 1937, 1973 
3971, 3791, 3179, 3917, 3719, 3197 
9713, 9137, 9317, 9173, 9371, 9731 
7139, 7913, 7931, 7391, 7193, 7319  
Four digits in middle vertical line  2 2580, 0852 
Diamond shape  24 2684, 2648, 2486, 2468, 2846, 2864 
6842, 6482, 6248, 6824, 6284, 6426 
4268, 4826, 4862, 4683, 4628, 4268  
8426, 8264, 8624, 8346, 8462, 842 
Rectangle shape 24 1346, 1364, 1463, 1436, 1634, 1643 
3461, 3641, 3146, 3614, 3416, 3164 
4613, 4136, 4631, 4361, 4163, 4316 
6134, 6413, 6314, 6143, 6341, 6431 
L shape 16 1478, 2589, 3214, 6547, 9632, 8521, 7896, 4563 
8741, 9852, 4123, 7456, 2369, 1258, 6987, 3654 
Y shape  24 1358, 1385, 1538, 1583, 1853, 1835  
3581, 3851, 3815, 3158, 3185, 3518 
5813, 5138, 5381, 5831, 5318, 5183 
8135, 8513, 8153, 8315, 8531, 8315 
Reverse L shape  16 3698, 2587, 6541, 9874, 8523, 7412, 7896, 4563  
8963, 7852, 1456, 4789, 3258, 2147, 6987, 3654 
 
 Category 2:  PIN number is composed of three different digits 
1) Vertical line 
2) Horizontal line 
3) Diagonal line  
 
Table 3: Category 2 Number Groupings 
Pattern Number PIN Number Combination 
Vertical Line 24 1147, 1447, 1477, 2258, 2558, 2588, 3369, 3669, 3699  
7411, 7441, 7741, 8522, 8552, 8852, 9633, 9663, 9963 
5800, 5880, 5580, 2588, 2558, 2588 
Horizontal Line  18 1123, 1223, 1233, 4456, 4556, 4566, 7789, 7889, 7899 
3211, 3221, 3321, 6544, 6554, 6654, 9877, 9887, 9987 
Diagonal Line  12 7753, 7553, 7533, 9951, 9551, 9511 
3577, 3557, 3357, 1599, 1559, 1159 
 
 Category 3 PIN number is composed of two different digits 
There is no pattern for this category. However this category can be divided into two different sub categories for 
this category which are:  
1) 2 digits are repeated twice (for example, 1212)  







Table 4: Category 3 Number Groupings 
Pattern Number PIN Number Combination 




11xx, 1x1x, x11x, x1x1, xx11  
22xx, 2x2x, x22x, x2x2, xx22,  
33xx, 3x3x, x33x, x3x3, xx33, 
44xx, 4x4x, x44x, x4x4, xx44 
55xx, 5x5x, x55x, x5x5, xx55 
66xx, 6x6x, x66x, x6x6, xx66 
77xx, 7x7x, x77x, x7x7, xx77 
88xx, 8x8x, x88x, x8x8, xx88 
99xx, 9x9x, x99x, x9x9, xx99 
00xx, 0x0x, x00x, x0x0, xx00 




111x, 11x1, 1x11, x111 
222x, 22x2, 2x22, x222 
333x, 33x3, 3x33, x333 
444x, 44x4, 4x44, x444 
555x, 55x5, 5x55, x555 
666x, 66x6, 6x66, x666 
777x, 77x7, 7x77, x777 
888x, 88x8, 8x88, x888 
999x, 99x9, 9x99, x999 
000x, 00x0, 0x00, x000 
 Category 4: PIN number is composed of one number only 
In this category, there is no pattern as a single digit is repeated 4 times. 
 
Table 5: Category 4 Number Groupings 
Pattern Number PIN Number Combination 
1 Digit Repeated 4 times 10 1111, 2222, 3333, 4444, 5555 
6666, 7777, 8888, 9999, 0000 
 Category 5: PIN number with 19 or 20 
Whilst this does not represent a pattern, it would appear most likely that a date would have already past for 
it to be of some personal significance. Therefore it is expected that codes beginning 19 will be more 
frequent than those beginning with 20. 
 
Table 6: Category 5 Number Groupings 
Pattern Number PIN Number Combination 
Begin 19 100 19xx 
Begin 20 100 20xx 
 
 Category 6: PIN number with sequential numbering 
This pattern is 4 digits in numerical ordering - the most basic of pins & therefore maybe occurring regularly 
as the sequence is easy to remember. 
 
Table 7: Category 6 Number Groupings 
Pattern Number PIN Number Combination 
4 digits in numerical order 7 0123, 1234, 2345, 3456, 4567, 
5678, 6789 
4 digits in numerical order in 7 9876, 8765, 7654, 6543, 5432, 
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reverse 4321, 3210 
 
 Category 7: 25 PIN numbers obtained from home alarm users.  
 
Table 8: Test set of genuine alarm codes  
Pattern Number PIN Number Combination 
Test set of 
genuine 
alarm codes 
30 0123, 0227, 0247, 0404, 0521, 0629, 0904, 1470, 
1234, 1962, 2468, 2514, 2875, 3107, 4201, 4425, 
4663, 4989, 4927, 5242, 5683, 7233, 7479, 7777, 
7942, 8282, 8888, 8989, 9876, 9908 
 
Once the categories of PIN numbers were chosen, the expectations of the analysis were then derived as follows: 
A large number of PIN numbers in the database will at least belong to one of six categories.  
1) The analysis by Berry (2012) and the analysis of the 700 PIN numbers will indicate relative similarity.  
2) A specific category will be noticeably more popular than other categories  
3) It is expected that the percentage of PIN numbers than do not belong to a category will not exceed 
50%, since most categories were identified and users are assumed to choose a PIN number according to 
its simplistic nature or a specific pattern  
4) The specific most popular PIN number is expected to belong to one of the six categories  
5) A brute force attack performed with the most popular PIN numbers and/or the most popular category 
will reduce time taken for a successful brute force attack to at least half.  
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
The 700 PIN numbers present in the database were examined and analysed according to their distinctive 
characteristics including them into at least one of the categories. If a PIN number did not belong to at least one 
category of the six defined, it was to be defined as no category PIN number. As an assumption was that people 
would choose PIN numbers that were easy to memorise over random numbers, category 4 was the simplest 
category and was expected to occupy at least one-third of the database. Category 1 and 2 dealt with PIN 
numbers with a certain pattern, and since the initial assumption was that a significant percentage of users would 
draw certain pattern on a keypad to aid themselves with memorising as discussed by Rasmussen and Rudmin 
(2012), percentages of expected numbers of the 700 code dataset could be calculated and then measured against 
what was actually present. The results are shown in Table 9.  
Table 9: Pin Numbers by Primary Category 
Variance Expected Actual over/under expected 
Category 1  10% 1% -9% 
Category 2  10% 0% -10% 
Category 3 15% 8% -7% 
Category 4 30% 1% -29% 
Category 5  5% 4% -1% 
Category 6 15% 1% -14% 
No category 15% 85% +70% 
Total 100% 100%  
It was somewhat unexpected to observe that a large number of PIN numbers in the database did not belong to 
any one of the six categories. 85%, which accounts for 595 PIN numbers did not belong to a category which 
might hint that the alarm users were comfortable to select PIN numbers with no apparent pattern and memorise 
them. This significantly deviated from initial expectation and findings of previously research where ease of 
memorising the number in apparent patterns was a significant influencing factor. The aim of the research was to 
identify users’ behaviour relating to choice of alarm codes and to show that a brute force attack would be 
significantly more efficient by taking into consideration people’s behaviour. The initial results were tending 
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towards showing that the results of the alarm code choice were different than for other types of PIN codes and 
certainly greatly differed from the findings of Berry. 
Expectation had been that category 1 would to compose about 10% of the database, that is, about 70 numbers 
were to be expected in this category. Despite only two possible combinations available, the four digits in the 
middle of the keypad were expected to appear more than other patterns in the category, due to its frequent 
occurrence at the study by Berry (2012). Although there were more available combinations existed, Y shape was 
not expected to appear as much due to more complicated nature of the pattern. For other patterns, at least half of 
the available combinations were expected to appear in the database. 
Table 10: Pin Numbers Analysed In Category 1 
Variance  Expected Actual over/under expected 
 Square 12 1 -11 
Middle four digit  10 1 -9 
Diamond shape 12 0 -12 
Rectangle shape 12 0 -12 
L shape 8 2 -6 
Y shape 8 1 -7 
Reverse L shape  8 3 -5 
Total 70 8  
In general, all of the possible combinations in this category were heavily underestimated. The most distinctive 
pattern in this category was the shapes that related to ‘L’ shape, whether it is reverse or straight L shape. Against 
expectations, the middle four digits vertically down the keypad was not a common choice and appeared only 
once in the database. In category 2 it was expected that approximately 10% of PIN numbers or 70 PIN numbers 
would be present. However, none of the 700 PIN numbers in the database belonged to this category.  In category 
3 the initial expectation was that this category was to appear about 15%, which is about 105 PIN numbers. It 
was found that only 56 or fewer than half expected belonged to this category. In category 4 210 numbers were 
expected yet only 6 existed and in category 5, despite the simplicity involved in the numbers in the category, the 
result was heavily under expected. The result analysed in this category significantly differed from the analysis 
by Berry (2012), where all the PIN number combinations in this category were apparent in his top ten most 
popular 4-digit PIN numbers. A noticeable behaviour is that the PIN numbers 1111 and 6666 are not present in 
the database. These PIN numbers may avoided for most people due to concern of the PIN number 1111 or 1234 
or superstition relating to 666. It is also interesting to note that PIN 0000 was not present which may indicate 
that the commercial nature of the dataset had led to a requirement to change the default codes, something that 
may not occur always on home alarm systems. The results are shown in figure 2. 
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 Figure 2: Most commonly chosen PIN numbers 
It was decided to use these 12 categories as the test categories. Added to this at the head of the list is a 13 th 
category, one number repeated twice. Whilst this does not form a pattern, it was found to be the most common 
approach to choosing a number. Finally, the 30 test PIN numbers were analysed utilising the standard sequential 
brute force attack and this was compared with the modified brute force attack. These 30 test PINs were obtained 
by asking people known to the researcher, and who had home alarm systems, what numbers they had used in the 
past or currently used. The purpose is to test the modified attack on a distinct dataset to show that it is more 
efficient than the standard attack. The process is to work through the categories of PIN numbers from most 
likely to least likely and once all numbers in the categories have been exhausted, revert to a sequential brute 
force attack on the remaining numbers. Table 11 shows the number of codes in each of the 13 categories. 
 
Table 11: The 13 categories for the modified attack  
Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Number  320 10 45 36 7 7 100 100 2 8 8 112 20 
 
The problem of including shapes formed but out of sequence highlights the necessity to look carefully through 
the chosen codes and plot them on the keypad. Selecting these numbers allows for easier memorisation but 
makes it more difficult for the attacker unless they are aware of this type of behaviour.  
Table 12: Standard v Modified brute force attack 
Category Code 
1 0227 0904 4425 4663 4989 5242 7233 7479 9908 
3 0404 8282 8989 
5 0123 1234  
6 9876 
7 1962 
11 2875  
12 2514 
NIL 0247 0521 0629 1470 2468 3107 4201 4927 5683 7777 7942 8888 
 
The total number of PIN codes that could possibly fall into one of these 13 categories is 767 out of 10 000 codes 
which equates to 7.67% of the codes. With 30 codes in the test dataset, it would therefore be expected that 2.3 
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codes would be expected to be into one of these categories if chosen randomly. Results show that 18 of the 30 
codes or 60% fell into these categories. This shows the effectiveness of the new attack with a well over 50% 
chance that the code will be found in the first 767 codes attempted rather than 5000 attempts with the standard 
brute force attack. However, it is not always the case that a code will be found more quickly with the modified 
attack. Rather, on average the code will be found more quickly with the new attack. Overall the modified attack 
is likely to lead to the code being found in much fewer attempts than the standard attack and therefore in a 
quicker time on average of approximately 767 attempts multiplied by 5 seconds per attempt equates to  3835 
seconds or just over one hour as opposed to almost 7 hours with the standard attack. This research shows that 
the choosing PIN codes for alarms should be a robust process rather than allowing users to choose their own 
codes where personal influences may lead to simplified attacks. These attacks can be mitigated by choosing 
random numbers and by ensuring codes longer than 4 numbers are chosen. The preference should be for 6 
numbers selected randomly to increase the time of this attack from just over one hour to 690 hours, or over 4 
days with a manual attack and to place a sensor in sight of all keypads so that an attacker cannot enjoy the 
luxury of time when mounting this attack, even when automated with the use of a computer. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether alarm code PIN numbers were predictable by pattern of 
frequency of chosen numbers. The study by Berry in 2012 of 3.4 million different PIN codes released on the 
Internet was used as a basis for comparing the 700 genuine alarm codes obtained from a single source. Analysis 
found that alarm code PIN number choice varies from PIN numbers utilised in other systems requiring a 4 digit 
PIN number. However, some unique features were determined which would allow a brute force attack against 
an alarm code to be simplified by trying more likely types of PIN numbers first and leaving the least likely PIN 
number to last. While the results did not closely follow the Berry findings, this study has highlighted the 
necessity for users to choose PIN number that are not easily predicted and utilise methods to memorise PIN 
numbers that cannot be predicted by an attacker. Further research is planned where a physical implementation of 
the attack will be performed utilising a laptop computer, an alarm system and a file of 10 000 Pin codes listed 
from most to least likely. These will be read one at a time and tried against the alarm system so that the 
improvement in speed in locating a number can be demonstrated. This research forms the basis of a guideline on 
how users should select PIN numbers that are more secure than the numbers that are currently being chosen. 
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